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Compensation of Outside Directors:
An Empirical Analysis of Economic Determinants
Abstract
Little is known about the economic environments and determinants of the compensation arrangements for
outside board members.  As delegated monitors of corporate management, board members act as
shareholders’ agents.  Thus, a potential for misaligned interests exists, requiring in turn incentive
arrangements that are incentive-compatible and individually rational.  We study the economic determinants
of both the levels and mix of compensation for outside board members.  We also examine the effects of
the existence of a director pension plan on the relation between director compensation and the hypothesized
determinants.  In sum, and contrary to criticism that the board of directors is often a passive, ineffective
entity that dislikes conflict with incumbent management, we find that board compensation is structured to
mitigate agency problems inherent in firms whose management control is separated from ownership.
JEL classification: J33, D82, D23
Key Words: Director compensation, outside directors, director pension plan, incentive contracts, agency
theory
1For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that boards, especially
those dominated by outsiders, appear to be effective in correcting severe corporate malfunctions. Weisbach
(1988) finds that outsider-dominated boards are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs. On the
other hand, a growing body of evidence suggests that board characteristics are not significantly related to
firm value [e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker, 1999].
Compensation of Outside Directors:
An Empirical Analysis of Economic Determinants
1. Introduction
While board member characteristics and board composition have attracted significant attention from
both financial economists and practitioners, compensation paid to outside directors has escaped similar
scrutiny.  One possible reason for the paucity of the studies on director compensation (compared to the
extensive line of research on CEO compensation) is that, relative to CEOs whose contributions and
decisions critically affect firm performance and value, the board of directors’ role as a corporate monitor
appears of reduced importance, except for the extreme scenarios where the board’s intervention is
warranted.1
However, outside board members, acting as monitors of corporate behavior, also serve as
shareholders’ agents.  Therefore, a potential for misaligned interests exists, requiring in turn incentive
arrangements that are incentive-compatible and individually rational for board members, as for executives.
Limited evidence suggests that outside board members are paid increasingly in a manner to mitigate such
agency problems.  For instance, over the past five years, remuneration for outside directors has increased
by 70%, largely due to the growth of stock-based compensation (stock and stock options) [Oppermann,
1997; Schellhardt, 1999; Perry, 1999].  Further, Hambrick and Jackson (2000) find that outside directors
of forty high-performing firms hold 1.3% of stock in their company (in 1987), compared to only 0.1% for
a matched-industry sample of poorly-performing firms.  Also, Perry (1999) documents that firms with
independent boards whose outside directors receive stock options are more likely to dismiss the CEO of
poorly-performing firms.  
We attempt to fill the research void by comprehensively analyzing the economic determinants of
both the levels of compensation paid to outside directors and the mixes of incentive-based compensation
2Two related, but tangential, studies are by Perry (1999) and by Vafeas (1999b) who examine the adoption
of director incentive plans (i.e., the dichotomous measure of “use” or “non-use” of stock options for outside
directors).
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in the total board compensation package.  The determinants we consider are agency-theory-based under
the proposition that outside director compensation packages are constructed to alleviate potentially
misaligned shareholder-board member interests.  We examine cash compensation, stock option awards,
and stock grants. We also examine the determinants behind the presence of outside director pension plans
and explore whether the existence of such a plan affects our results.2
   Using a sample of more than 1,700 U.S. firms over the 1992-1997 period, we provide strong,
overall support for the hypothesized determinants.  We find that the level of outside director stock option
awards is positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities, institutional stock holdings, and the threat
of takeover, and negatively associated with firm size, the number of lines of business, managerial stock
ownership, and regulation.  By comparison to stock option awards, we find that the level of director stock
grants is negatively related to the firm’s growth opportunities and takeover threat.  We find that the mix of
stock option compensation to cash compensation is positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities,
institutional stock holdings, and negatively associated with managerial stock ownership, firm leverage,
effective tax costs, free cash flow, firm size, number of  business segments, and regulation.  We find that
the mix of stock grants to cash compensation is negatively related to growth opportunities and positively
related to firm leverage, liquidity, firm size, and the number of segments.  Finally, we find that director
pension plans have a set of economic determinants similar to that for director cash compensation and that
the existence of a director pension plan does not affect the relation between director compensation and the
hypothesized determinants.
In summary, we conclude that outside board compensation packages are designed largely around
agency-cost reduction, arising from management oversight and control that is separate from ownership.
Thus, it appears that compensation packages paid to outside directors are designed to resemble
compensation packages paid to the CEO.  This conclusion contrasts with criticisms that board members
3are often passive and ineffective, shunning conflict with incumbent management [Crystal, 1991; Jensen,
1993].  Our findings and conclusions, to our knowledge, represent the first comprehensive study on the
relation between a set of firm characteristics and outside director compensation.
The rest of the study is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes our hypothesized determinants.
Section 3 describes board compensation measures and the research design.  Section 4 provides descriptive
statistics on our sample and section 5 presents our empirical findings.  Section 6 provides evidence on
robustness checks and contains the results on outside director pension plans.  Section 7 concludes the
study.
2.  Hypothesized determinants
Boards of directors are the elected agents of shareholders.  Their role is to “manage” the “business
and affairs” of the corporation (e.g., see Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) §141(a)).
However, for large publicly-traded firms with many shareholders, internal management (e.g., the officers
of the firm) run the day-to-day operations, with the board playing a crucial oversight role on behalf of
shareholders.  The existence of agency problems between shareholders and internal management and the
resulting value loss has been well-documented [Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976].
However, agency problems also exist between shareholders and outside directors as well [Williamson,
1984; Fama and Jensen, 1983]. 
Following Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), we define agency costs as
the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests
and the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits.  One
way to alleviate the agency problems between shareholders and outside directors is to provide outside
directors with compensation packages that directly align the interests of both parties.  Types of
compensation include cash (e.g., annual cash retainer, fee per board meeting, and fee for chairing a
committee), stock option awards, restricted stock grants, and pension plans.  Each award has its benefits
and drawbacks in motivating directors to act in the best interests of their shareholders.  These benefits and
3Prior studies researching the association between the firm’s growth opportunities and CEO stock-based
compensation (especially stock options) include Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987), Clinch (1991),
Smith and Watts (1992), Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Yermack (1995),
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1996), and Kole (1997).  However, there is no comparable empirical
evidence on the board of directors’ stock option awards and stock grants.
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detriments, in turn, depend on the characteristics of each firm.
In the following subsections, we describe the various hypothesized attributes that are related to the
levels and mix of outside director compensation.  When there is a clear directional hypothesis, we present
it.  Otherwise, we discuss the rationales behind conflicting predictions. 
2.1. Investment opportunities
High growth firms tend to include stock option awards and stock grants in upper management
compensation packages.3  The reliance on stock-based compensation is due, in part, to the high level of
information asymmetry (and the low level of liquidity) that is typical of high growth firms.  Since stock-
based compensation captures future as well as present cash flows, prior studies argue that it dominates cash
as a form of compensation for investment-rich firms [e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992].
We predict that firms with rich investment opportunities are likely to rely heavily on stock-based
compensation. Thus, both the level of stock-based compensation and mix of stock-based compensation
to cash are predicted to be positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities.  However, the incentives
attached to stock option awards are not equivalent to those of stock grants.  Stock option awards provide
a convex payoff schedule, which likely induces the risk-taking that is critical for high growth firms [Bryan,
Hwang, and Lilien, 2000].  By comparison, stock grants, because of their linear payoff schedule, likely
contribute to the under-investment problem [Smith and Stulz, 1985] as risky, yet value-increasing, projects
are less likely to be pursued.  Thus, we predict that high growth firms will use stock option awards more
heavily than stock grants in outside directors’ compensation packages.
To measure investment opportunities, we use the market-to-book ratio and, alternatively, in our
robustness checks, research and development expenditures scaled by the market value of the firm,
5consistent with prior studies [e.g., Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996].
2.2. Managerial stock ownership
Firms whose managers hold a large fraction of equity have a reduced demand for additional
incentive or monitoring mechanisms [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].  Therefore, for these firms, we predict
that outside directors’ compensation packages will contain a lower mix of stock-based compensation.  In
addition, we expect the equilibrium levels of board compensation to be inversely related to managerial
stock holdings.
However, at high managerial shareholdings, two forces potentially counterbalance the substitution
of managerial ownership for incentive based board compensation.  First, at sufficiently high levels of stock
ownership, managerial entrenchment problems arise since outside monitoring forces such as takeover
threats and proxy fights are unlikely to be effective [Stulz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991].  Second, managers typically are unable
to diversify away the risk associated with their wealth, since their personal capital is largely invested in a
single position of employment [Smith and Watts, 1992].  At significantly high levels of stock ownership,
it is possible that managers become overly risk-averse, thereby under-investing in value-increasing, yet
risky, projects.  Therefore, as managerial stock holdings increase above an “optimal” level, the equilibrium
level of outside director compensation and the mix of stock-based board compensation may become
positively associated with managerial stock holdings.  We examine this potential non-linear relation between
managerial stock holdings and board compensation by including a quadratic form of managerial stock
ownership as a separate independent variable in the regressions, patterned after prior studies [Stulz, 1988;
McConell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999].
2.3. Institutional stock ownership
The large stock holdings and sophistication of institutional investors can facilitate effective
monitoring.  This ensures that managers undertake value-maximizing investment projects [Graves, 1988;
6Hansen and Hill, 1991; Bushee, 1998].   In addition, institutional investors have fewer free rider problems
relative to fragmented individual shareholders.  This provides them with strong incentives to engage in
continuous information gathering of corporate affairs [Shleifer and Vishny, 1986].  Both lines of reasoning
suggest a substitution effect between institutional shareholdings and the level and mix of stock-based
compensation awarded to the outside board members.
However, managerial myopia (i.e., the focus on short-term performance) is often attributed to the
primacy of “transient” institutional investors (i.e., those who trade actively on short-term earnings) in the
market [Porter, 1992].  To counterbalance this effect, incentive-based compensation for outside directors
may be required.  In addition, large institutional investors have the clout to nominate board members of their
own choice and transfer the monitoring role to the board itself.  These arguments lead to a positive relation
between institutional ownership and the equilibrium level of compensation and the use of incentive-sensitive
stock-based compensation. 
2.4. Firm leverage
Debt can play a disciplinary role and mitigate agency costs arising from excess investment
[Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990].  Contractual commitments to pay interest and
principal on predetermined schedules limit managerial tendency to overinvest in value-decreasing projects
and consequently force managers to liquidate poorly performing assets to avoid technical default of debt
covenants.  In addition, debtholders demand premiums for increased firm risk, which can occur if incentive
plans attempt to align the interests of managers, directors, and stockholders at the expense of debtholders
[John and John, 1993; Yermack, 1995].  These two propositions suggest an inverse relation between debt
and both the equilibrium level and mix of board compensation.  We measure leverage as the sum of short-
term and long-term debt scaled by the market value of the firm.
2.5. Liquidity constraints
Firms with low liquidity are more likely to compensate outside directors with stock-based
4Starting January 1, 1994, the Internal Revenue Code §162(m) allows Section 12 firms to deduct
remunerations exceeding $1,000,000 for the CEO and the other four highest compensated employees,
respectively, only if the board has a compensation committee comprised solely of two or more outside
directors.
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compensation, rather than with cash compensation, since stock-based compensation conserves cash.  Thus,
we predict a negative relation between the mix of stock-based compensation to cash compensation and
liquidity.  We measure liquidity as free cash flow, defined as cash flows from operating activities less cash
outflows for investing activities, scaled by firm value, consistent with Matsunaga (1995) and Dechow,
Hutton, and Sloan (1996).
2.6. Tax costs
Stock option awards provide either no tax deduction (for “incentive” stock options) or a tax
deduction that is deferred until the options are exercised (for “non-qualified” stock options).  Restricted
stock grants offer a deferred tax deduction only when the restrictions lapse. Cash compensation, by
contrast, is immediately deductible.4  Therefore, the opportunity cost of losing the tax benefits by using
stock-based awards increases with firms’ marginal tax rates [Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Matsunaga,
1995].  Consequently, we expect firms with high marginal tax rates to shift the mix of director pay away
from stock-based compensation and toward cash compensation.  As a proxy for the firm’s marginal tax
rates, we use net loss carryforwards scaled by market value of the firm [Matsunaga, 1995; Yermack,
1995].  Since firms with a balance of loss carryforwards are likely to incur reduced tax payments than firms
without such a balance, the higher the net loss carryforward, the lower the marginal tax rates.
2.7. Firm size and the number of lines of business
The complexities of investing and operating decisions for large diversified firms make the boards’
monitoring function extremely difficult [Eaton and Rosen, 1983].  Complex firms may also have more risky
investment outcomes.  Under these arguments, larger, multifaceted firms will be associated with higher
outside director compensation levels and more stock-based compensation.  In contrast, as firms grow, they
8invest resources to establish effective internal control mechanisms, accounting systems, budgeting
processes, and performance evaluation systems.  If such planning and control systems provide timely
information to the board on managerial performance, then the demand for incentive sensitive board
compensation is likely to be reduced.
We use the natural logarithm of market value of the firm as a proxy for firm size, where market
value of the firm is estimated as the sum of market value common stock and total book liabilities.  As a
proxy for the number of segments, we use the natural logarithm of the number of lines of business reported
by Compustat’s Business Segment File.
2.8. Regulation
Direct monitoring and oversight by regulatory authorities decrease information asymmetries in
regulated firms.  With executives’ actions more observable, regulated firms have reduced needs for
incentive-sensitive compensation plans for outside directors [Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts,
1992].  Regulated firms also tend to have limited investment opportunities due to constraints that the
regulators impose [Joskow, Rose, and Shepard, 1993].
We use an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms in the electric utility, banking, and
insurance industries, and zero otherwise, consistent with Smith and Watts (1992).
2.9. Threat of takeover
The demand for incentive-sensitive board compensation is likely to be low if active markets for
corporate control discipline management and reduce agency costs [Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Fama and
Jensen, 1983].  This implies a negative relation between the threat of takeover and compensation levels and
mix.  Conversely, since firms with mismatches between growth opportunities and financial resources are
likely targets [Palepu, 1986], outside directors of firms that are taken over may be accused of poor
management of corporate resources, and, consequently may be replaced [Gilson, 1990].  If the threat of
takeover imposes added risk on outside board members, then compensation would increase.
5Palepu (1986) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that takeover activity has an important industry
component.
6Shareholders can sue directors for wasting corporate assets if they feel that directors are being
overcompensated.  However, a shareholder vote approving, for example, the issuance of stock options to
board members shifts the burden of proof from the board to the shareholders.  For this reason, many
companies present director option plans directly to the shareholder.
7If the annual retainer changes in the middle of the year, the previous and current year’s annual retainers
are prorated according to the relevant number of months and then summed to measure the current year’s
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Consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1998), we estimate the threat of takeover by measuring
the incidence of takeovers in a firm’s two-digit SIC industry during the preceding three years.5
3. Board compensation measures and research design
3.1. Outside director cash compensation, stock option awards, and stock grants
Directors have the legal authority, within limitations, to determine their own compensation packages
[DGCL §141(h); New York Business Corporation Law (NYBCL) §713(e)].   The amount and types of
authorized shares available limit stock options and stock grants and shareholders must vote to amend the
articles of incorporation if there is a change in stock (e.g., DGCL §242).  Many states’ corporate laws
specifically allow the board of directors to create stock option plans for its directors.  For example,
Delaware gives this right exclusively to the board (DGCL §157).  New York gives the right to the board
(NYBCL §202(13)) but requires majority shareholder approval (NYBCL §505(d)).6  The NASDAQ
stock market listing requirements mandate shareholder approval for the establishment of a stock option plan
for officers or directors [Sec. 4310(c)(25)(i)(a)].
We use four outside director compensation components: cash compensation, stock option awards,
stock grants, and pension plans.  Each metric is for one outside director.  Cash compensation is defined
as:
(1) Cash compensation  =  Annual cash retainer + (number of board meetings × fee per meeting),
where the number of board meetings is reported in the company’s proxy statements and the fee per meeting
attended usually is paid in cash.7
annual retainer.  This adjustment mitigates a potential measurement error from mismatched time periods.
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The cash compensation metric potentially suffers from measurement error.  For instance, it does
not include a fee for chairing a standing committee, since not every outside director serves in that capacity.
This fee is paid only once a year and is usually smaller than the combined fees paid for committee meetings.
Furthermore, since cash compensation includes fees per board meetings, firms with more annual board
meetings will register higher cash compensation per director.  In addition, the number of board meetings
appears to be correlated with firm characteristics such as past firm performance and managerial
shareholdings [Vafeas, 1999a].  These points suggests that the level of cash compensation and the
regression coefficients in our models may be unduly influenced by firms having abnormally high or low
board meetings.  We perform sensitivity analyses in Section 6 to address this issue.
Outside director’s stock option awards are measured as:
(2) Stock option compensation  =  (per share option value × number of options awarded),  
where the per share option value is estimated using the Black-Scholes (1973) model.
Instead of using a dichotomous measure of stock options for outside directors [Perry, 1999;
Vafeas, 1999b], our measure takes into account the ex-ante value of stock option awards.  However, this
metric contains measurement error to the extent that Black-Scholes does not incorporate unique
characteristics of stock options, such as non-transferability of stock options and directors’ limited ability
to hedge their wealth [Huddart, 1994; Cuny and Jorion, 1995; Carpenter, 1998].  The metric also does
not include one-time stock options that are often granted to outside directors upon their nomination.  If this
one-time option grant reduces the need for further annual option awards, then our measure understates the
incentive effects derived from stock options.
Director stock grants are defined as:
(3) Stock grants  =  (number of shares granted × average stock price),
where average stock price is the average of beginning and end of the year stock prices.
The mixes of director stock option awards and of stock grants to cash compensation are:
8As a sensitivity check, we use OLS and a log-transformation for the mix variables.  The results with both
specifications are qualitatively the same as those reported throughout the paper.
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(4) Mix of stock option awards to cash compensation  
=  stock option compensation ÷ cash compensation, and
(5) Mix of stock grants to cash compensation  
=  stock grants ÷ cash compensation.
In addition, firms often provide outside directors with pension plans for a certain number of years
after retirement.  Pension benefits usually are determined by the number of years of service to the firm.  If
director tenure is positively related to the quality of that service, then director pension benefits reflect
performance as well.  The lack of consideration for the relation between director compensation (both cash
and stock-based) and director pension benefits can cause a measurement problem if pensions represent
a form of (deferred) compensation.  We examine these potential relations in our sensitivity section.  We use
an indicator variable as our measure of an outside director pension plan.
3.2.  Regression Specifications
Since stock options awards and stock grants are not provided every year to outside directors,
these variables have a preponderance of left-censored values (at zero).  To accommodate for the highly-
right-skewed distributions used in the levels regressions, we add the value of one to stock option
compensation and stock grant values before log-transformation, an approach similar to Lewellen, Loderer,
and Martin (1987).  For the mixes, we use a Tobit model because the distribution is less severely skewed,
even though it is also left-censored.8   We also take natural logs of firm size, the number of segments, the
percentage of managerial ownership, and the percentage of institutional stock ownership to mitigate
potential concerns arising from these skewed distributions.  
We include control variables for firm performance and firm risk in the levels regressions, since cash
compensation and stock values are related to these characteristics [e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker,
1999].  For firm performance, we use yearly stock returns; for firm risk, we use beta, estimated from a
9For purposes of exposition, we refer to the NASD as a stock exchange.
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one-factor market model using a maximum of 60 monthly stock returns ending at fiscal year-end.
For all regression results, we present the summary year-by-year regression coefficients to mitigate
potential serial correlations that may arise if we used the pooled data set.  One advantage to this approach
is that the summary of yearly regression coefficients is relatively free from heteroscedasticity.  The major
disadvantage of this approach is the loss of information relating to year-to-year variation, potentially leading
to reduced power of the empirical tests.
4. Sample and descriptive statistics
4.1.  Sample
All required data on outside director compensation are taken from Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
ExecuComp database for the 1992-1997 period.  ExecuComp covers companies from the S&P 500, S&P
400 mid-cap, and S&P 600 small-cap indices.  Firms changing their fiscal year-ends are dropped (for that
particular year) to ensure that board compensation relates to the whole year.  The sample firms must also
have data on the determinants and on the parameters of the Black-Scholes option pricing model available
from Compustat and CRSP databases.  The data on managerial ownership and institutional stock
ownership are from Compact Disclosure.  Compustat’s Business Segment Files provide the number of
segments.
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample firms by industry and stock exchange.  The
distributions of the sample companies by one-digit SIC code (panel A) and by stock exchange (panel B)
indicate that our sample firms are from a wide range of industries, market capitalizations, and stock
exchanges, reducing the concern with sample clustering.9
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides several interesting findings.  Consistent with anecdotal evidence [e.g.,
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Schellhardt, 1999], average level of cash compensation increased only 11%, from $23,960 in 1992 to
$26,550 in 1997, whereas stock option levels increased 170%, from $13,840 in 1992 to $37,290 in 1997.
Further, although the value of stock grants rose significantly from 1992 to 1997 (from $2,200 to $6,610),
the increase in total outside director compensation over the period was attributable largely to the dramatic
increase in stock option awards.
Examination of the time trends of the mixes between stock-based and cash compensation tells the
same story.  The mixes of stock option awards and stock grants relative to cash compensation increased
from 0.66 and 0.08 in 1992 to 1.60 and 0.25 in 1997, respectively.  The percentages of sample firms
issuing stock options (stock grants) increased from approximately 29% (15%) in 1992 to 56% (31%) in
1997.  As a result, over 75% of the sample firms granted either stock options or stock to the board of
directors in 1997, compared to 43% in 1992.  
Finally, we note a steep drop in the percentage of firms offering a pension plan for outside directors.
This decrease, from about 35% in 1992 to 16.75% in 1997, became visible in 1996.  One possible
explanation is that firms increasingly are replacing director pension plans with stock options or stock grants
[Oppermann, 1997]. 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the compensation variables and determinants used in the
analyses for the whole sample.  Since the sample firms are from different industries, size groups, and
exchange listings, considerable cross-sectional variations are found in the levels and the mixes of board
compensation and the hypothesized determinants.  The mean cash compensation is $25,050 with an inter-
quartile range of $15,000.  The mean values of stock options and stock grants are $24,430 and $3,520,
respectively, compared to the median values of $0, indicating highly skewed distributions.  The mix
variables reveal a similar pattern.  The means (medians) for stock option and stock grants are 1.13 (0.00)
and 0.14 (0.00), respectively.
Panel B also reveals wide cross-sectional variation in the hypothesized determinants.  The average
market-to-book ratio is 1.84 with an inter-quartile range of 0.97.  The mean (median) values of the
managerial stock ownership and institutional holdings are 12.11% (4.53%) and 52.42% (54.36%),
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respectively.  The average firm leverage is 0.16, relative the median leverage of 0.14.  The mean (median)
values of free cash flow and net operating loss, both scaled by firm value are -0.01 (0.00) and 0.01 (0.00),
respectively.  The mean (median) values of firm size and the number of segments are $7.99 billion ($1.57
billion) and 1.96 (1.00), respectively, and 17% of the sample firms are in regulated industries.  The mean
value of the threat of takeover, measured as the incidence of takeovers in a firm’s two-digit SIC industry
during the preceding three years, is 0.19, suggesting that on average slightly less than 20% of firms in a
typical industry experienced takeover activity.  The average stock returns and market beta for the sample
firms are 0.23 and 1.19, respectively.
4.3. Comparisons of board compensation and hypothesized determinants across stock exchanges
To highlight the cross-sectional variation in our data set, we test for differences in means across
stock exchanges in  Table 3. Consistent with a common belief, NASD companies, on average, exhibit
higher growth opportunities, are smaller, have fewer segments, and are riskier than NYSE firms.  Further,
relative to NYSE firms, NASD firms have higher levels of managerial stock ownership, lower institutional
stock holdings, lower leverage, lower free cash flow, higher net operating loss, and higher incidences of
takeover in their industries.  Similar differences are found between NYSE and AMEX firms.
Stock option levels are highest for NASD firms while stock grant values are greatest for NYSE
firms.  More interesting, the mean of the ratio of stock option awards to cash compensation is 0.73 for
NYSE firms’ directors, compared to 2.26 for NASD firms’ directors.  This finding is consistent with the
prediction that stock options provide a more efficient incentive to directors of high growth firms to mitigate
value loss from under-investment.
5.  Empirical evidence
5.1. Regression results for the levels of outside director compensation
We begin by presenting the results for the regressions on the levels of outside director
compensation components.  Table 4 reports average yearly coefficients and our t-statistics are based on
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standard errors using yearly regression coefficients.  The four columns provide results for cash, stock option
awards, stock grants, and total compensation, respectively. 
In column (4), the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is significantly positive, consistent with
the hypothesis that total compensation is positively associated with the firm’s growth opportunities.
However, this result is solely due to the significantly positive coefficient for the regression on stock option
awards (column (2)).  In contrast, the coefficients are significantly negative for the regressions on cash
compensation and stock grants (columns (1) and (3), respectively).   In tandem, these findings support the
prediction that, relative to stock grants and cash, stock option awards are a more efficient means of
providing desired incentives to outside directors of firms with a rich investment opportunity set.
For all four regressions, the coefficients on the percentages of managerial stockholdings are
statistically negative. These results are consistent with the substitution hypothesis, namely that high
ownership aligns otherwise divergent interests, reducing the demand for other incentive mechanisms [Jensen
and Meckling, 1976].  When we include a quadratic form of managerial stock ownership as a separate
independent variable (to test for a potential non-linear relation between managerial stock holdings and
board compensation), we find significant positive coefficients for all dependent variables.  This suggests that
as managerial stock ownership goes beyond optimal levels, managers likely become either overly risk-
averse or entrenched, prompting shareholders to respond with adequate monetary incentives to outside
directors to mitigate any potential value loss.
The coefficients on institutional ownership are all significantly positive, suggesting that high
institutional ownership complements, rather than substitutes for, outside director compensation.  
The coefficient on leverage is significantly negative only for the regression on stock option awards.
Thus, heavily leveraged firms have fewer stock option awards in board compensation.  One possible
explanation is that the value loss from increased agency costs of debt exceeds incentive effects of stock
options.  An alternative explanation based on debt’s disciplinary role does not appear to be plausible, since
we find no evidence of a negative relation between leverage and director cash compensation or stock
grants.
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Director cash compensation and stock grants are positively related to both firm size and the number
of lines of business, consistent with the view that as the complexity of the firm’s operations increases, the
equilibrium levels of these compensation components also increase.  However, the level of board’s stock
option awards is negatively related to firm size and number of segments, suggesting that well-established
internal monitoring mechanisms reduce the need for stock option awards. 
The coefficients on regulation are significantly negative, supporting the prediction that regulated
firms have reduced need for monitoring by outside directors.
Finally, the threat of takeover appears to have opposing effects on board compensation. While the
coefficient on takeover threat is significantly positive when the dependent variable is stock option awards,
it is significantly negative when the dependent variable is either cash compensation or stock grants.  An
explanation for this result is the down-side risk protection on directors’ wealth (due to the convexity of the
option payoff function).  Conversely, stock grants can exacerbate the risk due to the linear payoff schedule.
The coefficients on the two control variables, stock returns and beta, have the expected signs
overall.  As firm performance improves, directors’ stock option awards and total compensation increase.
As systematic risk increases, stock option awards increase to compensate for the increased risk.  It is
possible, however, that this latter positive relation is mechanically induced, since systematic risk is positively
related to volatility of stock returns, which in turn increases the estimate of the fair value of stock options.
Interestingly, the relation between stock grants and beta is negative, suggesting that as firm risk increases,
stock grants become inefficient in providing desired incentives to outside directors possibly due to the linear
payoff function.
In summary, the results in table 4 indicate that the equilibrium levels of board compensation are
systematically related to the firm’s investment opportunities, managerial and institutional stock ownership,
firm size, the number of lines of business, industry membership, and the threat of takeover.  One notable
observation is that outside board stock option awards and stock grants are related to firm characteristics
quite differently.  Since stock option awards create a convex payoff schedule, they appear to be more
efficient in providing desired incentives to outside directors when firms have abundant investment
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opportunities and a high likelihood of takeover threat, relative to stock grants which have a linear payoff
function in stock price.
5.2.  Tobit results on the mix of board compensation
Table 5 presents the summary results of year-by-year Tobit regressions of the relation between the
mix of board compensation and the hypothesized determinants.  Column (3) provides the results for the
ratio of all stock-based compensation to cash compensation.  Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the
mixes of stock option awards and stock grants, respectively.
The coefficients on the market-to-book ratio, managerial shareholdings, institutional ownership,
leverage, firm size, the number of segments, and regulation are consistent with those reported in Table 4
and will not be elaborated upon.  One exception we note is that unlike the results reported for
compensation levels, we do not find a significant positive coefficient for the quadratic term of managerial
stock ownership for the mix regressions. 
The coefficient on free cash flow is significantly negative for the mix of stock option awards,
suggesting that liquidity constraints lead to heavy reliance on stock option awards relative to cash
compensation.  However, the liquidity constraint appears to have the opposite association with the mix of
stock grants, contrary to prediction, and the explanation is not readily apparent.
The coefficients for the firm’s net operating loss carryforward are significantly positive, consistent
with the prediction that as implicit tax costs of stock option awards and stock grants decrease, firms are
more likely to use stock-based compensation, relative to cash compensation.
In sum, the results in table 5 provide evidence that the mix of director stock option awards and the
mix of stock grants are systematically related to certain firm characteristics.  In particular, the mix of stock
option compensation is positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities, institutional stock holdings, and
negatively associated with managerial stock ownership, firm leverage, effective tax costs, levels of free cash
flow, firm size, the number of segments, and regulation.  The mix of stock grants is negatively related to
growth opportunities and managerial stock ownership, and positively related to firm leverage, liquidity, firm
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size, and the number of segments.
6.  Sensitivity analyses and effects of cash pension plans
In this section, we test whether our results are sensitive to the number of board meetings and to
alternative proxies for the firm’s growth opportunities, log-transformations of certain variables, and industry
clustering of the sample firms.  We also examine cash pension plans for outside directors.  We propose that
these pension plans are deferred cash compensation and test whether the economic determinants behind
the existence of the plans are similar to those behind the levels of cash compensation.  We then examine
the robustness of the results reported in tables 4 and 5 to the presence of a pension plan in regression
models.  The rationale behind this test is that if pensions are deferred cash compensation to directors, then
the mix of stock options and grants to cash compensation will be upwardly biased for those firms with
pensions.
6.1. Number of board meetings and cash compensation
Cash compensation paid to directors increases with the number of board meetings since it includes
fees per board meeting. As we show in table 2, the average number of board meetings over the 1992-1997
period remains fairly constant at around 7.20.  However, the actual number of board meetings varies from
1 through 43. This suggests that the levels regression on cash compensation and the Tobit models on mixes
should be related to the number of board meetings.  In addition, the number of board meetings is related
to firm specific attributes, such as past firm performance and managerial shareholdings [Vafeas, 1999a].
Thus, it is possible that our independent variables are correlated with the number of board meetings,
producing ambiguous interpretations of the reported results.
To examine these issues, we perform three sensitivity analyses.  First, we add the log of the number
of board meetings as an independent variable to levels and mixes regressions.  Table 6 presents the results.
As expected, the coefficient on the number of board meetings is significantly positive for the cash
compensation regression (0.34; t = 24.10) in panel A.  The coefficients on the mixes models in panel B are
10Although an examination of potential determinants of a sudden change in the board activity is beyond the
scope of our study, unusual board activities appear to related to poor prior firm performance [Vafeas,
1999a], new external financing, restructuring or divestitures, mergers and acquisitions.
11We also use different cutoff points for the abnormally high number of board meetings including 50%
(losing 5.4% of the original observations) and 200% (0.25%) and obtain similar results.
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all significantly positive (the coefficients vary between 0.33 and 0.96; the t-statistics are between 4.89 and
5.83).  More important, the coefficients and statistical significance levels of the other independent variables
are virtually identical to those reported in tables 4 and 5.  The one exception is that leverage becomes
significantly negative at the .05 level for the levels regressions on cash compensation and total
compensation.
Second, we delete from the final sample those firm-year observations that have an “abnormally”
high number of board meetings during a year compared to other firm-years.10  We define an abnormal level
of board meetings as one with an absolute change of more than 100% in the number of meetings for the
same company over two adjacent years.11 This screening process eliminates 98 firm-year observations,
or 1.2% from the sample.  Our results on the levels of components of director compensation and the mix
of stock-based compensation remain almost unchanged after deleting firm-year observations classified as
having unusually high number of board meetings.
Finally, we eliminate firm-year observations that fall in either the bottom 5% (4 meetings per year)
or the top 5% (13 meetings) of the distribution of the number of board meetings, assuming that it is unusual
to have less than four meetings or more than 13 meetings during a year.  Since this cutoff is rather arbitrary,
we also use a 10% threshold to truncate the extreme observations.  We continue to have similar results after
removing from the sample those extreme firm-year observations.
6.2. Alternative variable definitions
As an alternative proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities, we use research and development
(R&D) expenditures scaled by firm value [e.g., Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996].  The coefficients
on R&D have the same signs as those using the market-to-book ratio and the statistical significance remains
12A fifth type of compensation, a phantom stock or deferred stock grant pension plan, is not examined
because the ExecuComp data set does not contain information on this type of plan.
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qualitatively the same.
The regressions use log-transformed variables for the levels of board compensation and also for
certain independent variables to mitigate concern over non-normal distributions.  Since we estimate
statistical significance of the independent variables using annual regression coefficients only, the benefit of
using the log-transformed variables is likely small.   When we use raw variables in regressions, we obtain
similar results.
It is unlikely that industry clustering causes a serious bias in estimating regressions since as table 1
shows, the sample firms are from a variety of industries without any particular industries dominating the
sample.  Nonetheless, we estimate the regressions for each two-digit SIC industry (after dropping the
regulation dummy) and aggregate the regression coefficients only across these industries and obtain
qualitatively similar results.
6.3. Sensitivity to the presence of a director cash  pension plan
Thus far, we have examined the determinants behind cash compensation, stock grants, and stock
options.  A fourth type of director compensation, a cash pension plan upon retirement from board activities,
is also prevalent.12  In this section, we provide some preliminary evidence on the determinants of the
presence of a pension plan for outside directors, and we examine whether the presence of a pension plan
for outside directors affects our inferences on the relation between the mix of stock-based compensation
and the hypothesized economic determinants.
Directors’ retirement plans typically are defined benefit plans equal to the last annual retainer that
the outside director received prior to retiring from the board.  A “vesting” period of three to ten years of
service as a board member is usual.  Payments are received upon retirement or a specified age (65 or 70
being the most common).  Many plans include benefits for a surviving spouse.
As table 2 shows, the percentage of firms offering cash retirement plans for outside directors has
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diminished dramatically over time.  In 1992, 34.78% of our sample firms offered these plans.  By 1997,
the percentage declined to 16.75%.  Perusal of proxy statements indicate that the predominant stated
reason for firms discontinuing cash pension plans is that they do not align the interests of directors with
shareholders.  This is because cash pension plans act as deferred cash compensation whereas deferred
stock plans are more akin to stock options.  Thus, we expect that the coefficients of the determinants of
pension plans will behave most similarly to the cash compensation variables as shown in table 4.
Table 7 provides the summary of year-by-year results on the relation between the presence of a
pension plan for outside directors and the economic determinants.  In contrast to table 4, we are unable
to calculate a dollar value for pensions.  Therefore, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the firm
has an outside cash pension plan and zero otherwise.  In column (1), we use a logit model to calculate the
coefficients.  In column (2), we present OLS results so that the reader can compare the coefficients from
the cash compensation regressions in table 4 with the pension results.  The OLS estimators are unbiased
but are not efficient due to the heteroskedastic nature of the disturbance.  In addition, since a binary
dependent variable produces error terms that are not normally distributed, classical tests of significance on
the estimators cannot be done.  To mitigate these concerns, we report t-statistics using yearly regression
coefficients.
As column (1) shows, the existence of a pension plan is negatively associated with the firm’s growth
opportunities, managerial stock holdings, the likelihood of a takeover threat, and systematic risk of the firm.
It is positively associated with institutional shareholdings, firm size, and the number of segments.  From
column (2), we note that the OLS coefficients on these independent variables are similar to those found for
director cash compensation (shown in column (3)).   Thus, with the exception of the sign and significance
level on the regulation, it appears that current cash compensation and the existence of a pension plan
(deferred cash compensation) have similar determinants.  To our knowledge, this is the first evidence on
the potential determinants of pension plans for outside directors. 
Table 8 examines the degree to which the presence of an outside director  pension plan affects the
results reported in tables 4 and 5.  For instance, pension benefits may provide outside directors with
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incentives to adopt a long-term decision horizon and consequently replace, at least partially, stock-based
compensation.   In panel A, we find that cash compensation is significantly positively related to the existence
of a pension plan.  In contrast, the level of stock option awards is significantly negatively related to the
presence of such a plan.  These findings suggest that pension plans supplement (substitute) for cash
(incentive-based) compensation.  
The results for the Tobit models in panel B provide similar results and interpretations.  While this
paper does not explore this issue more fully, we believe that it is a topic of interest for future research.  For
this study, however, we note the coefficients and significance levels of the other variables in the analyses
do not differ substantially from those presented in tables 4 and 5.  The two exceptions are the coefficients
on beta in the cash compensation regression and on institutional ownership in the stock compensation
regression which, in panel A of table 8, are not significantly different from zero.  Hence, we conclude that
our earlier results are not influenced unduly by the presence or absence of an outside director pension plan.
7.  Conclusions and future research
This study tests hypothesized determinants of compensation for outside members of the board of
directors.  Using a large sample of U.S. firms over the 1992-1997 period, we find that the level of director
stock option awards is positively related to the firm’s growth opportunities, institutional stock holdings, and
the threat of takeover, and negatively associated with firm size, the number of lines of business, managerial
stock ownership, and regulation.  Conversely, the level of stock grants is negatively related to the firm’s
growth opportunities and takeover threat.  We find that the mix of stock-based compensation relative to
cash compensation is positively related to firm’s growth opportunities, institutional stock holdings, and
negatively associated with managerial stock ownership, firm leverage, effective tax costs, level of free cash
flow, firm size, the number of segments, and regulation.  Further, the mix of stock grants relative to cash
compensation is negatively related to growth opportunities and positively related to firm leverage, liquidity,
firm size, and the number of segments.  The documented differences between stock options and stock are
attributable to their respective payoff functions.  Since stock option awards create a convex payoff
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schedule, they appear to be more efficient in providing desired incentives to outside directors when firms
have abundant investment opportunities and a high likelihood of takeover threat, relative to stock grants,
which have a linear payoff function in stock price.
We also examine the determinants and effects of an outside director pension plan.  We find that
director cash compensation and the presence of a pension plan have a similar set of economic determinants.
In addition, the existence of a pension plan appears to influence the amount of cash compensation and stock
options given to outside directors.  We believe this is an interesting, yet preliminary result, and are intending
to address it in more detail in a later paper.
In sum, and contrary to some criticisms that the board of directors are often a passive, ineffective
entity that dislikes conflict with the incumbent management [Crystal, 1991; Jensen, 1993], we find that
board compensation is structured to mitigate agency problems inherent in firms whose management control
is separated from ownership.
Future research can extend our study by incorporating the possible endogenous aspects of board
stock option awards and stock grants.  Prior studies show that the adoption and existence of executives’
incentive contracts not only reflect the firm- and industry-specific characteristics underlying the firm’s
contracting and economic environment, but they also affect the executives’ operating, investing, or financing
decisions [Larcker, 1983; Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker, 1989; Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995;
Guay, 1999].
The distinction between “dedicated” institutional investors and “transient” institutional investors
appears to be another fruitful area in future compensation studies.  Namely, do the different types of
institutional investors affect agency relations of the firm?  Recent studies begin to provide some guidance
on this issue [e.g., Bushee, 1998].
Our understanding of board compensation could be further enhanced by investigating the
composition of the board to determine the nature of the relation between board composition and board
compensation.  Perry, 1999, presents some interesting work in this area. In order to gain additional insights
into efficient board contracting, more work on this line appears warranted.
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Further, we consider only the effect of the “flow” of stock options and exclude the “stock” of
options that are granted in prior years.  Since stock options granted in prior years are on average in-the-
money [Guay, 1999] and in-the-money stock options have greater sensitivity to stock price, future research
can examine the incentive effects of both the “flow” and the “stock” of stock options.
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Distribution of the sample firms by one-digit Standard Industry Code (SIC) and exchange listing
Panel A: The distribution by one-digit SIC code
One-digit SIC Industry description





(4) Transportation and utilities 215
(5) Wholesalers and retailers 208
(6) Financial services 232
(7) Business services 131
(8) Consumer services     53
Total number of firms 1,723
Panel B: Exchange listings
Stock exchange Number of firms
New York Stock Exchange 1,187
NASD 494
American Stock Exchange  42
Total 1,723
Final sample firms satisfy the following requirements:
  (i) The annual data on the board of directors’ stock option awards, stock grants, and cash
compensation (annual retainer and fees paid for committee meetings) are available from the
Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for at least one year over the period 1992-1997;
(ii) The firm maintains the same fiscal year-end from one year to the next;
(iii) The data on the parameters for the Black-Scholes option valuation model and the hypothesized
determinants of the board of directors’ compensation are available from Compustat’s 1998
Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary, Full Coverage, Research Annual file, and the Center for
Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) database.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics on the board of directors’ compensation and hypothesized determinants
Panel A: Trends in the board’s cash compensation, stock option awards, stock grants, and pension plans
over the 1992-1997 period
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
No. of firms 966 1,336 1,418 1,455 1,425 1,379
No. of board meetings 7.36 7.20 7.19 7.16 7.11 7.23
Level of board compensation ($1,000)
Cash compensation 23.96 23.97 24.71 25.19 25.53 26.55
Stock option awards 13.84 15.39 19.94 23.37 33.15 37.29
Stock grants 2.20 1.96 2.49 2.82 4.64 6.61
Stock option awards plus stock
grants
16.04 17.36 22.42 26.19 37.78 43.90
Total compensation 40.00 41.32 47.14 51.38 63.32 70.45
Mix of board compensation
Mix of stock option awards to cash
compensation
0.66 0.76 1.02 1.09 1.47 1.60
Mix of stock grants to cash
compensation
0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.25
Mix of stock option awards plus
stock grants to cash compensation
0.74 0.84 1.12 1.21 1.66 1.85
% of firms that grant:
Stock option awards 29.19% 34.80% 41.04% 47.76% 52.00% 56.05%
Stock grants 15.21% 15.86% 18.19% 20.55% 26.31% 31.18%
Stock options or stock grants 42.96% 49.03% 56.91% 64.19% 70.02% 75.70%
% of firms with a pension plan
for outside directors
34.78% 31.36% 31.73% 34.24% 24.49% 16.75%
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on the board of directors’ compensation variables and hypothesized
determinants for the pooled sample
Variable Mean Std. dev 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
Level of board compensation ($1,000)
Cash compensation 25.05 11.89 17.00 24.50 32.00
Stock option awards 24.43 62.88 0.00 0.00 22.15
Stock grants 3.52 10.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock option awards plus stock
grants
27.95 63.04 0.00 8.05 28.33
Total compensation 52.99 64.33 24.80 36.00 56.92
Mix of board compensation
Mix of stock option awards to
cash compensation
1.13 2.76 0.00 0.00 0.92
Mix of stock grants to cash
compensation
0.14 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mix of stock option awards plus
stock grants to cash
compensation
1.27 2.77 0.00 0.29 1.15
Economic determinants
Market-to-book ratio 1.84 1.14 1.12 1.44 2.09
Managerial ownership 12.11 17.38 1.03 4.53 16.34
Institutional ownership 52.42 20.25 38.47 54.36 67.28
Leverage 0.16 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.25
Free cash flow -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.03
Net operating loss 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm value ($ billion) 7.80 22.08 0.54 1.55 5.53
No. of segments 1.96 1.39 1.00 1.00 3.00
Regulation dummy 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
Takeover threat 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.21
Return 0.23 0.44 -0.03 0.16 0.41
Beta 1.19 0.64 0.77 1.13 1.51
The variables are defined as follows:
Cash compensation = annual director retainer plus the number of board meetings times
fees paid per director meeting;
Stock option awards = annual stock option compensation measured as per share Black-
Scholes option value times the number of stock options granted;
Stock grants = annual stock compensation measured as the number of shares
granted times the average stock price;
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Stock option plus stock grants = stock option awards plus stock grants;
Mix of stock option awards to = the ratio of stock option awards to cash compensation;
  cash compensation
Mix of stock grants to = the ratio of stock grants to cash compensation;
  cash compensation
Mix of stock option awards = the ratio of stock option awards plus stock grants to cash
  plus stock grants to  compensation;
  cash compensation
Market-to-book ratio = the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of total assets,
where market value of the firm is measured as the sum of
market value of equity and book value of total liabilities;
Managerial ownership = proportion of shares held by officers, directors, beneficial
owners, and principal stockholders owning ten percent or more
of the company stock.  Officers, directors, and beneficial
ownership are only included if they hold at least 1,000 shares;
Institutional ownership = proportion of shares held by all institutions filing a 13-F form with
the SEC, i.e., organizations, companies, universities and other
groups that have greater than $100 million in equity assets;
Leverage = short-term debt plus long-term liabilities scaled by firm market
value;
Free cash flow = free cash flow scaled by firm market value, where free cash
flow is measured as cash inflows from operating activities plus
cash outflows to investing activities;
Net operating loss = net operating loss carryforward scaled by firm market value;
Firm value = market value of the firm;
No. of segments = the number of separately reported business segments; estimated
over 60 months ending at the end of fiscal year, where the
market return is proxied by the value-weighted market return;
Regulation dummy = an indicator variable for regulated firms which equals 1 for firms
in the electric utility industry (two-digit SIC of 49) or financial
industries  (SIC of 60, 62, 64 through 67) and 0 otherwise;
Takeover threat = the incidence of takeovers in the firm’s two-digit SIC industry
during the preceding three years;
Return = stock rates of return during the fiscal year; and
Beta = the systematic risk measured using a one-factor market model




Comparison of mean values of the board of director compensation variables
and hypothesized determinants across stock exchange listing
Variablea






t-stat. z-statc t-stat. z-statc
No. of observations 5,792 2,016 171
Level of board compensation ($1,000)
Cash compensation 27.76 17.81 18.28 37.53*** 34.75*** 13.64*** 10.84***
Stock option awards 18.70 40.78 25.42 -11.66*** -17.25*** -1.76* -4.87***
Stock grants 4.51 0.82 1.63 19.87*** 19.31*** 5.42*** 4.81***
Stock option awards
plus stock grants
23.22 41.59 27.06 -9.68*** -8.44*** -1.01 -1.80*
Total compensation 50.98 59.41 45.34 -4.32*** -6.89*** 1.54 3.13***
Mix of board compensation
Mix of stock option
awards to cash
compensation
0.73 2.26 1.49 -16.37*** -18.73*** -2.94*** -5.29***
Mix of stock grants
to cash
compensation
0.17 0.05 0.07 14.54*** 18.65*** 3.32*** 4.62***




0.90 2.31 1.57 -15.02*** -11.17*** -2.59** -2.32**




1.66 2.37 1.91  -19.54*** -19.39*** -2.84*** -3.72***
Managerial
ownership
10.70 15.44 18.84 -10.41*** -19.74*** -4.81*** -6.09***
Institutional
ownership
53.92 49.14 42.16 8.58*** 9.49*** 7.02*** 6.79***
Leverage 0.18 0.10 0.14 25.62*** 26.62*** 3.82*** 4.55***
Free cash flow 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 11.67*** 13.33*** 2.74*** 4.07***
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Net operating loss 0.00 0.01 0.03 -4.23*** -4.70*** -3.72*** -5.49***
Firm value
($ billion)
9.99 2.09 1.16 22.27*** 33.20*** 25.10*** 11.99***
No. of segments 2.17 1.28 1.67 29.37*** 24.78*** 5.79*** 3.98***
Regulation dummy 0.18 0.14 0.02 5.05*** 4.77*** 12.59*** 5.36***
Takeover threat 0.19 0.20 0.18 -2.46** -3.11*** 2.14** 0.38
Return 0.22 0.27 0.16 -3.72*** -0.21 1.61 3.15***
Beta 1.12 1.42 1.30 -15.90*** -15.72*** -2.74*** -2.19**
aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
bTests for differences are in relation to the NYSE sample.
cNon-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum z-statistics.
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
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Table 4
Summary of year-by-year ordinary least squares regression results for the association between the level
of the board of directors’ compensation components and the hypothesized economic determinants













































































































Adjusted R2 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.18
aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions. 
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
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Table 5
Summary of year-by-year Tobit regression results for the association between the mix of the board of
directors’ compensation components and the hypothesized economic determinants (Reported coefficients












Mix of stock option







































































aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
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Table 6
Summary of year-by-year ordinary least squares regression results for the association between the level
and the mix of the board of directors’ compensation components and the hypothesized economic
determinants with the number of board meetings as additional independent variable (Reported coefficients
are inter-temporal means and t-statistics are based on yearly regression coefficients.)
Panel A: Results for the levels of board compensation components
Independent
variablea



















































































































Adjusted R2 0.36 0.14 0.15 0.24
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Table 6 (Continued)












Mix of stock option













































































aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
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Table 7
Summary of year-by-year logit and ordinary least squares regression results on the economic
determinants for the presence of a pension plan for outside directors (Reported coefficients are inter-













































































Adjusted R2 - 0.20 0.32
Concordant 79.40% - -
aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions. 
bThe dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a firm has a pension plan for outside directors and 0
otherwise.
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
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Table 8
Summary of year-by-year ordinary least squares regression results for the association between the level
and the mix of the board of directors’ compensation components and the hypothesized economic
determinants with the presence of director pension plans as an additional independent variable
 (Reported coefficients are inter-temporal means and t-statistics are based on yearly regression
coefficients.)
Panel A: Results for the levels of board compensation components
Independent
variablea

















































































































Adjusted R2 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.18
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Table 8 (Continued)












Mix of stock option













































































aPlease refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
***(**,*) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, two-tailed.
